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FIRST AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS ON TITLE I
PROGRAMS IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly forty years,' the Supreme Court has wrestled with the
establishment clause2 problems raised by government3 efforts to fund
programs benefiting students of private schools.4 As the political mood
of the country has swung toward conservatism in recent years, these
problems, which cut to the heart of sensitive church-state relations,
have come into sharper focus. In evaluating the constitutionality of
government programs designed to aid private schools, the Court has
charted an uncertain path, upholding some programs5 while striking
I. The Court first considered the constitutionality of public aid to parochial school
students in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946). Everson is often heralded as
the first modern establishment clause case.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. reads, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...."
3. Generally, state and local governments have provided the funding for programs
aiding parochial schools. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Reagan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (state funds for testing and recordkeeping); Committee for
Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (New York statute
providing tuition grants, tax benefits and funds for maintenance and repair). Aguilar v.
Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985), is the first case challengingfederal aid to elementary and
secondary parochial schools to come before the Supreme Court. See Wheeler v. Bar-
rera, 417 U.S. 402, 405 (1974).
4. In the 1980-81 school year, private schools enrolled about 5.3 million schoolchil-
dren. Cooper, McLaughlin, & Manno, Latest Word on Private-School Growth, 85
TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 88, 96 (1983). Experts predict that by 1990, 5% of all
American schoolchildren will attend private schools. Id. at 95. Catholic schools make
up the largest bloc of private schools. See generally id. Catholic school enrollment,
however, is declining, perhaps because of financial difficulties: "Between 1965 and
1983, the number of Catholic elementary and secondary schools dropped from a total of
13,292 with enrollments of 5.6 million pupils to 9432 schools with slightly over 3 mil-
lion children." Id. at 91.
5. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980) (state mandated testing and recordkeeping); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977) (books, testing, diagnostic and therapeutic services, off-site remedial services);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (revenue bonds); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971) (construction grants and loans to church related colleges and universities
under the federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
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down others. 6 With no coherent method of legal analysis, the Court
has relied on factual distinctions to differentiate permissible from im-
permissible parochial school aid programs.'
In Meek v. Pittenger,' the Court held inter alia that a program em-
ploying public school teachers to conduct educational activities on pri-
vate school premises violated the establishment clause.9 In the
aftermath of Meek, local implementations of the federal Title 110 pro-
gram came under constitutional attack. 1 In its recent decision in
392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(reimbursement for bus transportation).
6. See, eg., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (instructional materials, equip-
ment, field trips); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (auxiliary services); Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (maintenance
and repair, tuition grants, tax benefits); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Reli-
gious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (internally prepared state-mandated testing); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 612 (1971) (teacher salaries, textbooks, instructional materials).
7. See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
8. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
9. Id. at 373. The educational activities performed by public school teachers in-
cluded remedial and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and testing, and
speech and hearing services. Id. at 367.
10. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat.
27 (codified at various sections of 20 U.S.C.). Because Congress incorporated ESEA
into the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 551, 95 Stat. 463 (codified in various sections of 20 U.S.C.), which is now part of
Subtitle D of Title V of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Title I is now a
misnomer. See Wilson, ESEA Title I Litigation-Update, 28 CATH. LAW 159, 159
(1982). Nevertheless, the courts continue to use Title I as a shorthand reference to the
statute, and this Recent Development will follow that practice.
11. In 1976, the National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty
(PEARL) filed the first case directly challenging the constitutionality of Title I in the
federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. See National Coalition
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
appeal dismissed sub nom. National Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Hufstedler, 449 U.S. 808, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980). Because of a procedural
error, the Supreme Court never heard the case. See Wilson, supra note 10, at 159.
Plaintiffs also filed actions in California, Kentucky, Minnesota and Missouri, as well as
a second suit in New York. The second New York case, Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct.
3232 (1985), reached the Supreme Court.
An earlier case had presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of Title I, but the Court declined to do so. In Wheeler v. Barrera, 417
U.S. 402 (1974), the Court held only that nonpublic school students are entitled to
comparable, if not identical, services under Title I to those provided public school stu-
dents. Id. at 425. The Court decided the case as a matter of statutory construction.
The Court stated, "At this time, we intimate no view as to the Establishment Clause
effect of any particular program." Id. at 426. But several justices in separate opinions
did take the opportunity to express their views on the constitutionality of Title I pro-
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Aguilar v. Felton, 2 a divided Court followed Meek to invalidate New
York City's implementation of Title I in private schools. 3
II. HISTORY OF AGUILAR
Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965"4 in response to the problem of educational depriva-
tion in low income areas. 5 Title I provides federal funds for special
educational programs to supplement existing state and local pro-
grams 6 for children17 who are both educationally deprived18 and live
in low-income areas.'9 The regulations promulgated under Title I re-
grams in which public school teachers instruct on private school premises. Justice Pow-
ell said that he ". . . would have serious misgivings about the constitutionality of a
statute that required the utilization of public school teachers in sectarian schools." Id.
at 428 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice White was "pleasantly surprised by what ap-
pears to be a suggestion that federal funds may in some respects be used to finance
nonsectarian instruction of students in private elementary and secondary schools." Id.
at 429 (White, J., concurring). Justice Douglas commented that "the Act is unconstitu-
tional to the extent it supports sectarian schools, whether directly or through its stu-
dents." Id. at 432 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
12. 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985).
13. Id. at 3238-39.
14. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 95 Stat. 27 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
15. Congress intended that the Act would broaden opportunities for private school
students to participate in remedial programs. S. Rae. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1965). The Senate report lists several possible Title I programs including supplemen-
tary instructional materials, curriculum materials centers, remedial programs, enrich-
ment programs, instructional media centers, mobile learning centers and supplemental
health and food services. Id. at 10-1I.
16. The federally funded programs must supplement, not supplant, state programs.
See 34 C.F.R. § 200.62 (1985). See generally Holl, The Title I Supplanting Prohibition,
9 NOLPE SCH. L.J. 23 (1980).
17. The Act refers to aid to children, rather than aid to schools. Thus, Title I is
arguably analogous to the legislation at issue in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947), in which the Court upheld bus fare reimbursement as permissible aid to children
rather than unconstitutional assistance to parochial schools. Id. at 5. See infra note 37-
38 and accompanying text; Anastaplo, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 11
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 151, 157 (1981).
18. The implementing regulations define "educationally deprived children" as "chil-
dren whose educational attainment is below the level that is appropriate for children of
their age." 34 C.F.R. § 200.3(b)(2) (1985).
19. The Congressional statutory declaration of policy states:
In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income families
and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of
local educational agencies to support adequate educational programs, the Congress
hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial assist-
1986]
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quire that services provided to nonpublic school students be compara-
ble to those provided public school students.2" The language of the
statute does not explicitly authorize sending public school teachers into
private schools to conduct educational activities.21 Nevertheless, the
Senate report suggested that on-premises instruction might be an op-
tion for local educational agencies.22
ance.. to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children
from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by
various means... which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational
needs of educationally deprived children.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10 1 § 2, 79 Stat. 27,
27 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 2701 (1982)). Congress structured the Act so that local educa-
tional administration would remain in the hands of local educational agencies (LEAs);
Congress did not want to federalize traditional local control over education. LEAs pro-
pose Title I programs for local implementation; state educational agencies (SEAs) must
approve the plans. Congress then channels the funds through the SEAs for implemen-
tation of the plans by the LEAs.
20. 34 C.F.R. § 200.71 (1985). The regulations do not require that private school
programs be identical to those in public schools; rather, they demand that LEAs dis-
tribute services to private school students on an equitable basis:
... In consultation with private school officials, an LEA shall provide education-
ally deprived children residing in a project area of the LEA who are enrolled in
private elementary and secondary schools with special educational services and ar-
rangements as will assure participation on an equitable basis of those children...
... If the LEA decides to serve educationally deprived, low-income children
under Section 556(b)(1)(C) of Chapter 1, the LEA shall also provide Chapter 1
services to educationally deprived, low-income children in private schools as will
assure participation on an equitable basis of those children...
(b) Services on an equitable basis. The Chapter 1 services that an LEA pro-
vides for educationally deprived children in private schools must be equitable (in
relation to the services provided to public school children) and must be of sufficient
size, scope, and quality to give reasonable promise of substantial progress toward
meeting the special educational needs of the private school children to be served.
34 C.F.R. §§ 200.70(a), 200.71(b) (1985). See also Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402,
422 n.17 (1974).
The program, however, has not been administered equitably. One 1977 report esti-
mated that Title I aid reached only about 47% of eligible nonpublic school students,
and that those students received only about 18% of the services to which they were
entitled. Vitullo-Martin, Interim Report, Summary Report: Delivery of Title I Services
to Non-Public School Students, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 15 Before the Subcomm.
on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the House Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 555, 565 (1977).
21. See Felton v. Secretary, Dep't. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), afj/d sub
nom. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985): "If we were to look only at the language
of the statute, we would not be altogether sure that a program sending public school
teachers into religious schools was authorized." 739 F.2d at 50 n.2.
22. The Senate Report noted the appropriate restrictions on such instruction:
"[P]ublic school teachers will be made available to other than public school facilities
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol30/iss1/13
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In 1976, taxpayers began to mount constitutional challenges to Title
I programs as administered in parochial schools.23 The New York City
program was the target of litigation that reached the Supreme Court in
Aguilar.24 The district court held that New York City's use of Title I
funds for remedial instruction by public school teachers on the prem-
ise s of parochial schools was consistent with the establishment clause.
25
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the presence of public school
teachers in private parochial schools created a risk that the public per-
sonnel would act to foster religion.26 In Aguilar a sharply divided
Supreme Court affirmed that holding.27 Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, relied on entanglement principles2" articulated in Meek
and Lemon v. Kurtzman29 to invalidate the New York City program.30
Justices Burger, Rehnquist,3 O'Connor and White32 filed separate dis-
sents; O'Connor accused the majority of mishandling first amendment
doctrine to strike down a legitimate government program that had
only to provide specialized services . . (such as therapeutic, remedial or welfare serv-
ices) and only where such services are not normally provided by the nonpublic school."
S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965).
23. See supra note I I.
24. Failure to file a timely appeal foreclosed earlier opportunity for Supreme Court
review of a Title I holding. See National Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Religion v.
Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), appeal dismissed sub. nom. National Coali-
tion for Pub. Educ. and Religion v. Hufstedler, 449 U.S. 808, reh'g denied, 449 U.S.
1028 (1980). Thus, it was a full nine years after the first challenge to Title I, see supra
note 11, before the Supreme Court issued an opinion on Title I's constitutionality. See
infra notes 105-144 and accompanying text.
25. The district court disposed of the case upon defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Aguilar, 105 S.Ct. at 3236.
26. Felton v. Secretary, Dep't. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), afl'd sub nom.
Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985). See infra note 75 (explaining Supreme Court's
concern that publicly employed teachers might improperly foster religion).
27. 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985).
28. For a discussion of entanglement principles see supra notes 50-53 and accompa-
nying text.
29. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 3237-38.
31. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2508 (1985) (invalidating school prayer
and meditation statute), Justice Rehnquist authored a comprehensive opinion expres-
sing his dissent to the judgments in Wallace, Aguilar and Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985) (invalidating local programs that provided for Shared Time
and Community Education classes in parochial schools).
32. Justice White wrote briefly to reaffirm his dissenting opinion in Lemon, 105
S.Ct. at 3248.
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been in successful operation for twenty years.33
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PUBLIC AID
TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
The Court decided Everson v. Board of Education,34 the first case
challenging government aid to parochial schools, in 1946. Everson up-
held a program that reimbursed parents of all schoolchildren, public
and private, for costs incurred in busing their children to school.3" Jus-
tice Black's majority opinion3 6 focused on the fact that the program
benefitted children, 7 rather than schoolsa 8 Justice Black emphasized
that the Court would not be so tolerant of aid programs that reached
farther than the one involved there:39 the reimbursement program ap-
proached the "verge" of constitutional permissibility.40
Following Everson, there was a twenty year lull in Supreme Court
consideration of parochial school aid statutes. In 1968, the Court up-
held a textbook loan program against an establishment clause chal-
lenge in Allen v. Board of Education.41 Again, the Court emphasized
that the benefits the program funded were available to all students in
33. Justice O'Conner stated that "over almost two decades, New York's public
schoolteachers have helped thousands of impoverished parochial schoolchildren to
overcome educational disadvantages without once attempting to inculcate religious val-
ues. Their praiseworthy efforts have not eroded and do not threaten the religious liberty
assured by the Establishment Clause." 105 S.Ct. at 3248 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
34. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
35. Id. at 5.
36. Justices Jackson and Rutledge filed dissenting opinions.
37. Justice Black explained that "the State contributes no money to the schools. It
does not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general
program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expe-
ditiously to and from accredited schools." 330 U.S. at 18. Compare the argument that
Title I is a general program benefitting all children, on the order ofEverson. Anastaplo,
supra note 17, at 157.
38. Cf. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680, 1682
(1969) ("The sharp dichotomy between pupil benefit and benefit to the school seems to
me a chimerical constitutional criterion.").
39. Cf Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation
of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1467 (1981) ("Black's unfortu-
nate reading of the facts in Everson undercut the general welfare exception; thus eviscer-
ated, the theory could provide no principled way of distinguishing free bus rides from
.state aid in the form of tuition grants or payment of other educational expenses.").
40. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
41. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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specified grades, regardless of type of school attended.4 2 The Court
noted that policy considerations played a significant role in its analy-
sis;43 it emphasized the important place of private schools in our na-
tional educational system." Justice Black4 5 dissented in Allen,
expressing concern that books could tend to propagate the religious
views of the schools.46
In 1971, the court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 7 holding unconsti-
tutional two state plans designed to supplement salaries of parochial
school teachers. 48 Lemon, though today considered a landmark estab-
lishment clause case, was only a plurality decision.49 The plurality as-
sembled three tests used in prior establishment clause cases and applied
them to the parochial school aid program. Now collectively known as
the Lemon test, the three prongs are: first, the enactment in question
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its primary effect must
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and third, its implementation must
not involve an excessive entanglement of government with religion.
0
The third prong, entanglement, has both administrative and political
42. Id. at 243.
43. Id. at 247.
44. Id. at 247. Compare Justice Powell's comments in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 262 (1977), arguing against a total cutoff of aid to parochial schools:
The persistent desire of a number of states to find proper means of helping sectar-
ian education to survive would be doomed. This Court has not yet thought that
such a harsh result is required by the Establishment Clause. Certainly few would
consider it in the public interest. Parochial schools.., have provided an educa-
tional alternative for millions of young Americans and in some states they relieve
substantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools.
Id.
45. Note that Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in Everson.
46. Alien, 392 U.S. at 252 (Black, J., dissenting). See Freund, supra note 38, at
1683, recalling Justice Black's "verge" language in Everson-" a bridge that carries you
to the verge is apt to be burned behind when you discover that the verge is farther ahead
after all."
47. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
48. The Pennsylvania statute at issue provided for reimbursement to schools for
teachers' salaries, textbooks and institutional materials; the challenged Rhode Island
statute provided that the state would pay a 15% salary supplement directly to nonpub-
lic school teachers. 403 U.S. at 607-10.
49. Chief Justice Burger delivered the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which
Justices Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun joined. Justices White, Douglas and Brennan
submitted separate opinions.
50. The Court adapted the first two prongs from a school prayer case, School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) The third prong originated in Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970), which involved property tax exemptions for religious institutions.
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aspects." Administrative entanglement reflects concern that day-to-
day government involvement with religious affairs injures nonadher-
ents by appearing to endorse a particular religion. 2 Political entangle-
ment rests on a notion that when government supports one or more
religions, religious views are apt to control the political choices of vot-
ers and legislators. 3 Applying the test, Chief Justice Burger's plurality
opinion found impermissible entanglement in Lemon. 4 He distin-
guished the plan at issue from the earlier textbook case, Allen, by rea-
soning that a teacher "under religious control and discipline"55 poses a
danger to separation of secular from sectarian that a book, whose con-
tents are readily ascertainable, does not.5 6
In his separate Lemon opinion, Justice White articulated the views
on which he relied in subsequent cases, including Aguilar.7 Justice
White lamented the quandary the Lemon test creates for parochial
schools: an aid program must provide sufficient monitoring to ensure
that religion is not advanced, yet that very governmental monitoring
gives rise to entanglement.5" Justice White favored an approach that
would uphold an aid program so long as the financing serves a "separa-
ble secular function of overriding importance." 59
The Court decided a trio of parochial school aid cases in 1973, strik-
51. See generally MacNab, The Forbidden Fruit of Church-State Contacts: the Role
of Entanglement Theory, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV 725 (1982). Generally, the presence of
political entanglement alone is not enough to render a program unconstitutional. Id. at
741.
52. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620; see infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
53. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. Cf Hitchcock, The Supreme Court and Religion: His-
torical Overview and Future Prognosis, 24 ST. Louis U. L. J. 183 (1980) (arguing that
the Supreme Court Justices are influenced by their religions when deciding establish-
ment clause cases).
54. Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion examined three aspects of the church-
state relationship to determine whether impermissible entanglement existed. First, it
examined the character and purposes of benefited institutions; second, it examined the
nature of the aid provided by the state; and third, it examined the resulting relationship
between government and the religious authority. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
55. Id. at 612.
56. Id. at 617.
57. Aguilar, 105 S.Ct. at 3248. See also Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105
S.Ct. 3216, 3248 (1985).
58. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668.
59. Id. at 664. Justice White explained that parochial schools have a "dual role,"
performing both secular and religious functions: "legislation having a secular purpose
and extending governmental assistance to sectarian schools in the performance of their
secular functions does not constitute law[s] respecting an establishment of religion for-
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ing down the challenged programs in each. Sloan v. Lemon' invali-
dated a program providing tuition grants; Levitt v. Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty6 struck down a program reim-
bursing private schools for the costs incurred in complying with state
testing and record keeping requirements. The third case, Committee
for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,62 invalidated a
comprehensive New York aid statute that provided funds for building
maintenance and tuition grants, and authorized tax deductions for par-
ents of children attending private schools. The Nyquist majority6 3 em-
phasized that the flaw in the statute stemmed from its direct provision
of funds to aid parochial schools, without corresponding safeguards
that the use of those funds would be limited to secular functions.'
Thus, the program violated the primary effect prong of the Lemon
test.65
In contrast, during the 1973 term, the Court did approve a legisla-
tive scheme providing state revenue bonds to finance building projects
at a sectarian college in Hunt v. McNair.66 Over Justice Brennan's dis-
sent,6 7 the Court distinguished Hunt from earlier cases by arguing that
higher-level institutions are less likely to inculcate religious values than
their elementary and secondary counterparts.68
The Court next examined the private school aid issue in Meek v.
Pittenger,69 decided in 1975. Meek presented a challenge to a Penn-
sylvania statute closely resembling Title I in its provision for "auxiliary
bidden by the First Amendment merely because a secular program may incidentally
benefit a church in fulfilling its religious mission." Id. at 663-64.
60. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
61. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
62. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
63. Justice Powell authored the majority opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Stew-
art, Marshall and Blackmun joined.
64. Id. at 780. Justice White, in dissent, argued that the statute was constitutional
because the state should reimburse parents of private schoolchildren to the extent it is
relieved of the burden of educating them. Id. at 814 (White, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 780.
66. 413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973).
67. Brennan argued that the state policing of college activities necessary under the
program to ensure nonsectarian use of funds rendered the program unconstitutional.
Id. at 752.
68. Id. at 745-46. See also Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736
(1976).
69. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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services. '7 Those services included publicly employed teachers con-
ducting remedial programs 7 on private school premises.72 Citing
Lemon, the Court held this portion of the statute unconstitutional. 73
The potential for improper fostering of religion is present, the Court
reasoned, any time teachers render services in a pervasively sectarian
atmosphere.74 Therefore, the state would need to maintain continual
surveillance to ensure that its publicly-funded teachers do not, even
inadvertently, 75 advance religion. Accordingly, this provision fell
under the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test.76
Other statutory provisions held unconstitutional in Meek included
direct loans of instructional materials 77 and equipment to nonpublic
schools. The Court stated that although the statute earmarked loans
for secular use only, it is impossible to separate the secular educational
functions of parochial schools from their predominantly religious mis-
sion.78 Nevertheless, a different majority of the Court79 upheld a pro-
vision of the statute that authorized textbooks loans on the authority of
Allen. 80
70. Id. at 352-53.
71. The remedial programs involved both individual therapy and classroom instruc-
tion. Id. at 352.
72. "Act 194 specifies that the teaching and services are to be provided in the non-
public schools themselves by personnel drawn from the appropriate intermediate unit,
part of the public school system .. " Id. at 353.
73. Id. at 372.
74. Id. at 371-72.
75. The Court does not infer bad faith on the part of teachers. The Lemon Court
states that "[w]e need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial schools will be
guilty of bad faith or any conscious design to evade the limitations imposed by the
statute and the First Amendment." 403 U.S. at 618. The Court's concern, however, is
that the atmosphere in which the teacher instructs may inadvertantly influence him.
The policing necessary to ensure that teachers "play a strictly nonideological role" gives
rise to excessive entanglement between church and state. Meek, 421 U.S. at 370.
76. Meek, 421 U.S. at 372.
77. The materials included maps, charts and laboratory equipment. Id. at 365.
78. Id. at 365. The Court held that the "direct loan" of these materials furthered
the sectarian mission of the schools. Id. at 363. Cf. text accompanying infra note 93
(discussing the Regan majority's reading of Meek).
79. The Justices upholding the textbook provision included Justices Stewart, Black-
mun, Powell, Rehnquist and White, and Chief Justice Burger. Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan and Marshall dissented.
80. Id. at 362. See Allen v. Board of Educ., 392 U.S. 236 (1968); supra notes 41-46
and accompanying text.
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In a subsequent case, Wolman v. Walter,8 the Court again dissected
a state aid program, upholding some of its provisions while declaring
others impermissible. The Court upheld provisions authorizing state-
funded textbook loans, testing services not under the control of the
private school, and diagnostic services and therapeutic services to be
provided away from private school premises. 82 Especially interesting is
the court's analysis of the provision for therapeutic services. The pro-
gram resembled both Title I and the program invalidated in Meek: all
three programs provided remedial and therapeutic services to nonpub-
lic school students.83 The Wolman program, however, specified that
the publicly-employed teachers and therapists were to render their
services in public schools, public centers or mobile units off the private
school premises.84 To the Court, this site consideration distinguished
the Wolman plan from the Meek program." The Court said that the
danger it perceived to be present in Meek, that teachers might improp-
erly advance religious ideas, was absent in Wolman because teachers
would be performing services away from the pervasively sectarian at-
mosphere of parochial schools.86
The most recent pre-Aguilar decision handed down by the Supreme
Court in the area of public aid to parochial schools was Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan,87 decided in 1980.
Regan, a 5-4 decision, 8 upheld a New York statute directing payment
to private schools for costs incurred in performing state mandated test-
ing and recordkeeping services.8 9 Regan was the first case to authorize
81. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
82. Id. at 255.
83. See supra notes 16-22 and 69-76 and accompanying text; 433 U.S. at 244-48.
84. 433 U.S. at 244 n.12.
85. Id. at 247.
86. Id. at 247: "So long as these types of services are offered at truly religiously
neutral locations, the danger perceived in Meek does not arise."
87. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
88. Justices White, Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger comprised
the majority in Regan.
89. Id. at 648. The legislation involved in Regan required that private school per-
sonnel administer tests prepared by the state. Id. at 645. Cf Levitt v. Committee for
Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (Court invalidated earlier New
York statute that financed tests prepared by private school personnel). The recordkeep-
ing services for which the Regan Court upheld reimbursement involved compilation of
data regarding the student body, faculty, physical facilities, curriculum and pupil at-
tendance. 444 U.S. at 656.
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direct payments of any kind to parochial schools." The majority held
that the services for which the schools receive reimbursements have
neither a religious purpose nor religious effect, 9' and that the auditing
procedures did not constitute impermissible entanglement. 92 Perhaps
the most important contribution of Regan to the Title I issue is its
reading of Meek. The Regan majority said that Meek, read in light of
Wolman, did not stand for the broad proposition that "any aid to a
sectarian school is suspect since its religious teaching is so pervasively
intermixed with each and every one of its activities."93 The Regan
dissent, 94 on the other hand, argued that Wolman reinforced the Meek
conclusion that "direct aid to the educational function of religious
schools necessarily advances the sectarian enterprise as a whole." 95
The Regan majority cautioned that its decision should not be consid-
ered a "litmus-paper"96 test for future problems. It acknowledged that
past decisions in the area avoided "categorical imperatives" and "abso-
lutist approaches," sacrificing "clarity and predictability" for "flexibil-
ity." 97Thus, although Regan demonstrated that the Lemon test could
be met by some legislative plans that provide aid to parochial schools,
the sharp division on the Court,98 together with the majority's reserva-
tions, evidences the uncertainty inherent in the test's application.99
90. See Comment, Committee for Public Education v. Regan: New Possibilities for
State Aid to Nonpublic Schools, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 406, 406 (1980). See also Com-
ment, Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rrv. 915, 940
(1981) (arguing that Regan is a policy decision designed to "maintain the viability of
parochial schools").
91. 444 U.S. at 658-59. Because the New York Law provides "ample safeguards
against excessive or misdirected reimbursement," the Court felt that the program's sec-
ular effect was ensured. Id. at 659.
92. Id. at 660. The New York statute required private schools to submit to the New
York State Commissioner of Education an accounting of their reimbursable costs under
the program along with substantiating documents. The statute also required periodic
review of the accounts of participating schools to verify expenses. Id. at 660-61.
93. Id. at 661.
94. Justice Blackmun filed a dissent in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion.
95. Id. at 666 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96. 444 U.S. at 662.
97. Id.
98. Note that although Justice Powell was in the Regan majority, upholding aid to
parochial schools, he also voted with the majority in Aguilar and wrote an opinion
concurring in that judgment. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
99. Outside the parochial school aid area, the Court continued the Regan ac-
comodationist trend. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984), the Court upheld
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The modern establishment clause cases demonstrate that in spite of
the Court's articulation of a test in Lemon, 1"o subsequent decisions
continued to turn on factual distinctions. In general, the Court has
permitted welfare services provided to all children regardless of the
type of school they attend. "' On the other hand, the Court has viewed
more suspiciously services which touch on the educational function of
parochial schools. 102 The Court has used location of service provision
as a differentiating factor between permissible and impermissible aid
programs. 103 The Court also makes a distinction between aid directed
to colleges and aid directed to lower level schools."° The Court in-
vokes these factual distinctions without persuasive empirical support.
Because of the Court's reliance on factual distinctions, the content of
the Lemon test remains in doubt. The Court's unprincipled application
of the Lemon test in the parochial school aid context renders predict-
ability of results almost impossible to obtain.
IV. AGUILAR V. FELTON
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided several cases involving sensitive
church-state issues."0 5 Two of those cases concerned public aid to pa-
rochial schools. In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,10 6 a divided
court struck down a locally-funded program in which publicly em-
ployed teachers conducted "Shared Time" and "Community Educa-
tion" classes in classrooms leased from private schools. 10 7 Over the
the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island's practice of exhibiting a creche in its annual
Christmas display. Id. at 1359. The Court characterized the creche as a symbol of
general good will, rather than one with religious significance. Id.
100. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1946); see also Anastaplo,
supra note 17, at 157.
102. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); see also Anastaplo, supra
note 17, at 159.
103. Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (off-site remedial services
permissible) with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (on-site remedial services
unconstitutional).
104. Compare Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (revenue bonds for sectarian
colleges upheld) with Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973) (aid package for lower level schools unconstitutional).
105. See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985).
106. 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985).
107. Id. at 3231. "'Shared Time" classes supplemented the core curriculum in pri-
vate schools by providing "remedial" and "enrichment" services. Id. at 3218. "Coin-
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partial dissents of Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, °8 and
the dissents of Justices Rehnquist"0 9 and White, the majority 10 con-
cluded that the Grand Rapids program violated the primary effect
prong of the Lemon test.'11 Because the Grand Rapids School District
failed to provide a system of monitoring to ensure that religion was not
advanced in the program classes," 2 entanglement was not an issue.
The Title I program at issue in Aguilar, in contrast, operated
through New York City's Bureau of Nonpublic School Reimbursement
which supervised all activities conducted in nonpublic schools." 3 The
city argued that this system of monitoring, bolstered by a twenty year
record of operation without incident, precluded a holding that the Title
I program had the effect of advancing religion." 4 The majority opin-
ion, authored by Justice Brennan, chose not to address that argu-
ment. n 5 Instead, the majority relied on the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test and the precedent set by Meek." 6
The majority identified the two concerns of the Lemon entanglement
munity Education" classes were offered after the close of the normal school day and
were strictly voluntary, nonacademic classes. Id. at 3219.
108. Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the
"Community Education" classes were unconstitutional, but dissented from the judg-
ment inasmuch as it struck down the "Shared Time" classes.
109. Justice Rehnquist wrote a comprehensive dissenting opinion in Wallace, 105
S.Ct. at 2508, on which he relied in Aguilar and Grand Rapids. See infra notes 132-38
and accompanying text.
110. Justice Brennan authored the majority opinions in both Grand Rapids and
Aguilar.
111. 105 S.Ct. at 3223-24.
112. Id. at 3224-25.
113. Aguilar, 105 S.Ct. at 3235. Field personnel of the Bureau of Nonpublic School
Reimbursement made occasional unannounced visits to participating nonpublic schools.
Title I instructors were directed to carefully avoid any involvement with the schools'
religious activities. All religious symbols were removed from Title I classrooms. Id.
114. Id. at 3236.
115. The majority explained:
Appellants' argument fails in any event, because the supervisory system established
by the City of New York inevitably results in the excessive entanglement of church
and state, an Establishment Clause concern distinct from that addressed by the
effects doctrine. Even where state aid to parochial institutions does not have the
primary effect of advancing religion, the provision of such aid may nonetheless
violate the Establishment Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of church
and state in the administration of that aid.
Id. at 3237.
116. Id. at 3237-38.
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prong.' 7 The Court declared that state involvement in the affairs of a
religious institution injures the religious freedom of nonadherents by
appearing to lend governmental support to the religion. '18 Conversely,
government interference compromises the religious freedom of adher-
ents. " 9 The Court found that the New York City program implicated
both concerns.' 20 Justice Brennan then surveyed the history of paro-
chial school aid decisions, although mention of Regan was conspicu-
ously absent.' 2' The Court cited language from Meek that focused on
the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of parochial schools. 12 2 Because
such an atmosphere might influence teachers and result in subtle or
blatant advancement of religion, the Court reasoned, state surveillance
is necessary to prevent that advancement of religion. Although the
Court conceded that the New York City plan arguably provided the
requisite monitoring to avoid the danger of improper effect, the Court
held that the surveillance impermissibly entangled the government
with the church schools.' 23
Justice Powell authored a separate concurring opinion. Powell
117. Id. See generally supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
118. 105 S.Ct. at 3237.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 3238. The pervasively sectarian nature of many schools involved in
New York City's Title I program required that a permanent state presence be main-
tained in the schools, thereby implicating the first concern. Id. at 3238. But cf. Lynch
v. Donnelly, 104 U.S. 1355 (1984) (Court approved exhibition of city owned creche in
Christmas display). The New York City Plan also implicated the second concern be-
cause it required sectarian schools to endure a permanent state presence. 105 S.Ct. at
3239.
121. Id. at 3237-38; see supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
122. 105 S.Ct. at 3238; see supra note 74 and accompanying text; cf the Regan
Court's reading of Meek, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
123. Justice Brennan stated:
This pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes
precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of exces-
sive entanglement. Agents of the state must visit and inspect the religious school
regularly, alert for the subtle or overt presence of religious matters in Title I
classes.... In addition, the religious schools must obey these state agents when
they make determinations as to what is and what is not a 'religious symbol' and
thus off limits in a Title I classroom. In short, the religious school... must endure
the ongoing presence of state personnel....
Id. at 3238-39. Yet, had the city failed to provide this monitoring, the Court would
undoubtedly have found its program unconstitutional under the "primary effect" prong
of the Lemon test. Cf Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985) (pro-
gram whereby publicly employed teachers conducted classes in private schools was un-
constitutional under the "primary effect" prong).
1986]
Washington University Open Scholarship
310 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 30:295
agreed that the New York City plan involved excessive entangle-
ment, 124 but went on to explore the question of whether the program
violated the primary effect prong of the Lemon test. To support his
affirmative answer to that question, Justice Powell argued that Title I
impermissibly subsidized private schools by relieving them of the duty
to offer remedial courses. 125 Powell characterized Title I aid as "di-
rect, ' 126 thereby distinguishing those cases in which the Court upheld
aid to parochial schools. 127
Chief Justice Burger's stinging dissent accused the majority of a
paranoic reaction to a legitimate and beneficial program.128 Relying on
his separate opinion in Meek v. Pittenger for support, 129 the Chief Jus-
tice argued that no demonstrable damage is done to the establishment
clause by Title I programs.13 He asserted that the majority's invalida-
tion of New York City's program, though purporting to be done in the
name of religious neutrality, actually evidenced hostility toward
religion. 3 1
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Aguilar for the reasons he articulated
in Wallace v. Jaffe,'32 in which he mounted an attack on the entire
framework of establishment clause jurisprudence. Rehnquist surveyed
the historical context of the adoption of the first amendment religion
clauses.133 Rehnquist concluded that the separationist theory' un-
124. Id. at 3240 (Powell, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 3241. The Court, however, had consistently rejected Justice Powell's
argument in prior cases. See, ag., Regan, 444 U.S. at 658; Roemer v. Maryland Pub.
Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 744 (1976); see also New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434
U.S. 125, 134 (1977). Further, the Title I statute itself belies Powell's subsidy concern:
Title I programs should only supplement parochial school programs already in exist-
ence. See supra note 16.
126. 105 S.Ct. at 3241 (Powell, J., concurring).
127. But cf Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980) (upholding direct grant to parochial schools for testing and recordkeeping
costs).
128. Chief Justice Burger stated: "It borders on paranoia to perceive the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury or the Bishop of Rome lurking behind programs... vital to the
nation's schoolchildren .. " 105 S.Ct. at 3242 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
129. Id. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
130. 105 S.Ct. at 3242 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 3242-43.
132. 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2508 (1985).
133. Id. at 2508-15. See generally Anastaplo, supra note 17, at 183; N. DORSEN, P.
BENDER AND B. NEWBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
1170 (4th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as N. DORSEN]; Note, supra note 39; THE Lim,
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derlying the modem court's analysis had no historical basis; rather, the
framers intended only to prevent the establishment of a national reli-
gion and to forbid governmental preference among religions. 35 He ar-
gued that the Lemon test, based upon historical misconception, is
unworkable.' 36 Citing the anomolous results and divided opinions re-
sulting from use of the Lemon test,137 Justice Rehnquist advocated
abandonment of the test in favor of an approach measuring legislation
against the historical basis of the establishment clause.13 8
Justice O'Connor also filed a separate dissent, joined in part by Jus-
tice Rehnquist. O'Connor first noted the majority's failure to address
the issue of whether Title I programs have the effect of advancing reli-
gion.' 31 O'Connor's evaluation of that issue yielded a negative an-
swer. "4 Justice O'Connor then criticized the majority's holding on the
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332-33 (A. Koch and W. Peden
eds. 1944).
134. The separationist theory entered the modem court's jurisprudence in Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1946):
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a
state or the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between church and state."
Id.
135. 105 S.Ct. at 2512 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This historical theory enjoys ac-
ceptance among a number of eminent constitutional scholars. See, e.g., Anastaplo,
supra note 17; N. DORSEN, supra note 133.
136. 105 S.Ct. at 2517-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that few Supreme Court opinions in the area of
aid to parochial schools ever commanded a majority of the Court; none has been unani-
mous. Id. at 2516.
138. Id. at 2520. Justice Rehnquist explained that "history abundantly shows...
nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between
religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursu-
ing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means." Id.
139. 105 S.Ct. at 3244 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 3245-46. Justice O'Connor pursued a factual analysis to reach the con-
clusion that the Title I program had no impermissible effect. The New York City pro-
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entanglement issue as inconsistent with the factual record,14 1 and ques-
tioned the utility of the entanglement test in any circumstances. 142 Ex-
pressing concern that the Court had repeatedly invoked entanglement
as an independent ground to thwart legislative efforts that had both
secular purposes and effects, 143 Justice O'Connor argued that entangle-
ment should be a consideration only as a factor in the Court's evalua-
tion of the effect of legislation. 1"
V. ANALYSIS
Aguilar v. Felton demonstrates the tenuous position the Lemon test
occupies. The majority's invocation of the entanglement prong to in-
validate New York City's Title I program seemed inevitable in light of
Meek,' 45 yet scrutiny of the Court's analysis reveals several flaws that
ultimately topple the analytical structure.
First, the majority's emphasis on avoiding the appearance of endors-
ing a religion seems out of step with the Court's recent decision in
Lynch v. Donnelly.'4 6 The city-owned creche, upheld in Lynch, con-
veys a message of government endorsement of religion far stronger
than that flowing from the offer of remedial services on private school
premises. The creche is a symbol with readily apparent religious signif-
icance; in contrast, the remedial classes conducted by Title I teachers
have no religious significance. "47 Moreover, the New York City pro-
gram had operated successfully for 14 years, without incident of improper advancement
of religion. Justice O'Connor stated that:
mhe actual and perceived effect of the program is precisely the effect intended by
Congress: impoverished school children are being helped to overcome learning
deficits, improving their test scores, and receiving a significant boost in their strug-
gle to obtain both a thorough education and the opportunities that flow from it.
Id. at 3245.
141. Justice O'Connor emphasized that in the 19 years the New York City Title I
plan operated, not one incident of teachers attempting to inculcate religion could be
cited. Id. at 3245.
142. Id. at 3247.
143. See generally Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Recon-
ciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 683 (1980) (arguing that enlargement
should not "represent a value to be judicially secured by the Establishment Clause.").
144. 105 S.Ct. at 3248.
145. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
146. 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984); see supra note 99.
147. As Justice O'Connor observed in her Aguilar dissent:
[A]n objective observer of the implementation of the Title I program in New York
would hardly view it as endorsing the tenets of the participating parochial schools.
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gram explicitly prohibits any involvement of public personnel in the
religious functions of the participating schools.148
Second, the majority argues that the religious schools suffer when
government intrudes into their day-to-day operation.149 Yet it is hard
to see how Title I programs are any more intrusive than the accepted
involvement of governmental agencies in setting curricula, mandating
state testing and establishing minimum attendance requirements for
private schools.15° Moreover, the sectarian schools stand to suffer
more if the Court forces the government to withdraw its sorely needed
aid.
Finally, the Lemon test has trapped the Court into a pattern of hold-
ings based on factual distinctions that seem to have little legal signifi-
cance. For example, the Aguilar majority distinguished the Title I
program, directing aid mainly to schools for younger children, from
constitutional programs aiding sectarian colleges. 5 ' The Court char-
acterized these lower level schools as "pervasively sectarian," with a
broader concern for the inculcation of religious values than their col-
lege counterparts.152 This conclusory characterization is inadequate to
explain why a Title I plan, specifically targeted for secular uses, should
fall while a general grant for any "non-sectarian purpose" to a sectar-
ian college' 53 withstands constitutional scrutiny. The Meek distinction
between on-site and off-site instruction is similarly flawed. The notion
that a public schoolteacher will abdicate his professional obligations
when he crosses the parochial school threshold has no empirical sup-
port. 154 The danger that state or local government will inadvertently
To the contrary, the actual and perceived effect of the program is precisely the
effect intended by Congress: impoverished school children are being helped to
overcome learning deficits, improving their test scores, and receiving a significant
boost in their struggle to obtain both a thorough education and the opportunities
that flow from it.
105 S.Ct. at 3245 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Aguilar, 105 S.Ct. at 3235: "The professionals involved in the program are
directed to avoid involvement with religious activities that are conducted within the
private schools and to bar religious materials in their classrooms."
149. Id. at 3239; see supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980).
151. 105 S.Ct. at 3238.
152. Id.
153. See Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976); see also supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
154. Cf Hargrove, Teachers' Perceptions of ESEA Title I Programs, 103 EDUCA-
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advance religion is no more present in a parochial school classroom,
that New York City demands be stripped of religious symbols, s55 than
it is in a mobile classroom down the block. 156
The Lemon test, as illustrated in Aguilar, leads to factual linedraw-
ing rather than clear judicial imperatives. Thus, the test both confuses
the lower courts and stymies legislatures. Legislatures must walk a
tightrope-they must draft programs with enough government con-
trols to assure that religion is not advanced but not so many that entan-
glement results. 57 As Aguilar demonstrates, the Lemon test often
operates to defeat the legislative process.
The vehemence of the Aguilar dissents and the current political cli-
mate portend a decline in the importance of the Lemon test. An addi-
tional Reagan appointee to the Supreme Court probably would shift it
toward a less separationist interpretation of the establishment clause.
The test that replaces Lemon should be designed to produce uniformity
of result. In the meantime, lower courts and legislatures have only the
imprecise contours of the weakened Lemon test to guide them in draw-
ing appropriate lines between church and state.
Laura L. Gaston*
TION 196, 196 (1982), assessing how teachers view operation of Title I programs: "The
perceptual framework of a teacher in a particular school is shaped by past and present
classroom experiences, by students, parents, and immediate colleagues." See also Agui-
lar, 105 S.Ct. at 3246 (O'Connor, J., dissenting): "Given that not a single incident of
religious indoctrination has been identified as occurring in the thousands of classes of-
fered in Grand Rapids and New York over the past two decades, it is time to acknowl-
edge that the risk identified in Meek was greatly exaggerated."
155. 105 S.Ct. at 3235.
156. The Court approved publicly financed instruction for parochial school students
conducted in mobile units in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); see supra notes
81-86 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
* B.A., University of Arkansas, 1982; J.D., Washington University, 1986.
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